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The Working Hours of Immigrants in Germany: 
Temporary versus Permanent 
 
Migration is often viewed as an investment decision. Temporary migrants can be expected to 
invest less in accumulating human capital specific to the host country. Instead, they work 
more hours in order to accumulate savings and invest in financial capital that can be 
transferred back to their country of origin upon return. In this paper, using German panel 
data, we explore how temporary migrants differ from permanent migrants in their labor supply 
decisions and behavior. Upon correcting for endogeneity bias, temporary migrants are found 
to work more hours than permanent ones. This result supports the human capital theory and 
a household production model of migration where migrants may be temporary by choice and 
not because of legal restrictions or even a bad experience in the labor market. 
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Introduction 
 
Migration, whether internal or international, is often viewed as an investment decision.  The costs 
of migration, which include physical costs of the move and costs of adjusting to a new location, 
are incurred in order to earn higher income in the future.  When exploring international 
migration, these adjustment costs have been viewed as the costs of adapting to the labor market 
in the destination country.  A large part of these adjustment costs may be the costs of investing in 
human capital, such as becoming more fluent in a language, at the destination.  Decisions 
regarding migration partly depend on whether the move is viewed to be permanent or temporary.   
We will concentrate on the demand for migrants in Germany and the adjustments migrants make 
when living in Germany.  Temporary migrants are expected to invest less in accumulating human 
capital specific to Germany.  Instead of spending time accumulating specific human capital, they 
are expected to work more hours in order to accumulate savings and invest in financial capital 
that can be transferred back to their country of origin when they return.  In this paper, we will 
explore temporary migration and how temporary migrants differ from permanent migrants in 
their labor supply decision making and behavior.  In the first section we will explain what is 
meant by temporary migration and review some of the literature.  Next, we will develop and 
discuss a model of temporary migration.  Third, we will discuss the data and the estimation 
procedures to be employed in testing the model.  Finally, we will discuss the conclusions implied 
by these estimates and some implications for policy.    
 
Temporary Migrants 
Temporary migration differs from permanent migration in terms of the migrant’s attachment to 
the labor market in the host country.  The temporary migrant plans on returning to the origin.    3 
This intention may be reinforced by contract, by immigration laws or it may simply be the 
intention of the migrant.  Temporary migration is a common and growing phenomenon 
(Dustman, 2000).  Temporary migration exists when the migrant expects to return to the home 
country and behaves accordingly while in the host country.  One type of temporary migration 
entails temporary residence permits which reinforce the intentions to return.  Examples include 
temporary migration from South Asia and South-East Asia to countries in the Gulf and migration 
from East Europe to the European Community.  However, temporary migration without these 
temporary residence permits is common in the US and in Europe. Indeed, European migration 
after the recent EU enlargements is predominantly of temporary nature, at least when judged by 
migrants' intentions.
1
One of the issues concerning temporary migration is that temporary migrants may invest 
less than permanent ones in human capital that is specific to the host economy.  The shorter the 
intended stay, the less such investment will be made.  An example of this type of investment is 
learning the language of the host country.  Another type of investment that is less likely to occur 
for temporary migrants involves job training conducted by employers.  A free rider problem may 
be more severe for temporary migrants than for other workers in that firms may be hesitant to 
invest in job training for temporary migrants because they will lose the benefits of this 
investment when the migrant returns to the home country.   Consequently, as Amin and Matoo 
(2005) point out, employers may prefer hiring permanent versus temporary migrants because they 
are more likely to capture the returns from this investment.   
   
Amin and Matoo develop a model where the country receiving immigrants faces a 
tradeoff between the lower social costs attributed to temporary migrants and external benefits of 
job training which are higher for permanent migrants.  They identify social costs of migration 
                                                 
1 See Kahanec et al. (2010) and the evidence summarized in Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010).   4 
such as the provision of publicly provided services not fully supported by the tax contributions of 
the migrants.  Temporary migrants might have lower social costs in part because they are less 
likely to move their family with them decreasing the demand for medical, educational and social 
services.  They also might be less of a threat to a society with xenophobic issues.  However, 
permanent migrants may invest more time assimilating to the host country.  Furthermore, on the 
job training is less likely to be lost when the temporary migrant returns to the source country 
because the probability of return migration is lower for permanent migrants.  Amin and Matoo 
argue that countries face a commitment problem in that they can not credibly commit to returning 
temporary migrants particularly when they receive training by firms.  As a result of this 
commitment problem, host countries restrict migration to a level below the optimum level but 
have too many permanent migrants.   
The reduction of these social costs has become a major concern in the migration literature.  
Social costs can be categorized as economic costs and cultural costs.  Much of the attention has 
focused on economic costs.  Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1987) find that assimilation does occur.  
Chiswick argues that gradual cultural assimilation of immigrants in the US has resulted in 
increased earnings.  Furthermore, this assimilation came through personal investment in human 
capital and not from on the job training provided by firms because firms are reluctant to invest in 
training immigrants partly because they perceive a higher risk of job mobility.  Borjas argues that 
the heterogeneity of immigrants is the source of assimilation differences and that immigrants, 
such as political refugees, who are more attached to the destination are the most likely to 
assimilate.  Since temporary migrants have less attachment to the destination than permanent 
migrants, we would expect less assimilation.     5 
Migration, both temporary and permanent, has had a considerable impact on the 
economies and cultures of industrialized nations.  Germany has perhaps the most experience with 
assimilating migrants.  From 1945 until 1960 about twelve million persons of German descent 
migrated into West Germany.
2  Because these migrants were forced to move by political changes 
and their language was German, they were almost entirely permanent migrants and their 
assimilation was relatively easy.  A rapidly expanding economy and a good experience in 
assimilating migrants resulted in a policy of bringing in new, temporary workers into Germany 
beginning in the 1950s.  These workers were from Southern Europe and Turkey.  The vast 
majority of these workers returned to their home country.
3
The result of this immigration pattern is that many German immigrants are and continue 
to be temporary.  Temporary migrants might differ from permanent migrants in many predictable 
ways.  First, they might be expected to save more and remit more of their income.  For example, 
Bauer and Sinning (2005) find that permanent migrants in Germany save less that native 
Germans.  This might be expected because part of what they would save is invested in acquiring 
human capital that aids in assimilation such as learning German.  Temporary migrants, however, 
make much less of this type of investment.  Bauer and Sinning found that their savings were 
similar to that of natives and, hence, higher than permanent migrants.  Their savings might have 
been higher than the savings of permanent migrants because of their greater desire to accumulate 
and transfer assets to the home country.   
  They were replaced by new 
immigrants, sometimes from the same country.  This pattern of migration is called circular 
migration, which results in a large proportion of workers that are not native born, being 
temporary instead of permanent migrants.   
                                                 
2 See Schmidt (1994). 
3 Bohning (???) estimates that over two thirds of these workers returned.     6 
Another feature of temporary migration concerns home ownership.  Germany has a very 
low rate of home ownership.  According to Constant, Roberts and Zimmermann (2007) only 42% 
of Germans own their own home compared with about 63% in the US.  Much of this low rate is 
probably due to the high requirements for down payment on loans in Germany.  These 
requirements can be as high as 40% of the purchase price.  Migrants, particularly temporary 
migrants might be expected to be much less likely to own a home than the population in general.  
It is not surprising that the home ownership rate for migrants is only 20%.  Constant, Roberts, 
and Zimmermann find that for migrants classified as having strong cultural attachments to 
German are much more likely to own their home even if they also maintain strong attachments to 
the country of origin.   
A third feature of temporary migration concerns the response to economic adversity in the 
destination.  An adverse experience with unemployment might shorten the stay of the migrant.  
This might particularly be the case for migrants who come on a short term visa.  Bellemare 
(2007) models the dynamics of their behavior.  Since migrant workers who experience high 
unemployment have less time to recoup lost income, their stay becomes undesirable, and they 
leave sooner than intended.  Bellemare points out that this is more likely to occur for unskilled 
workers because they face higher rates of unemployment.  Hence, skilled temporary migrants 
might be encouraged to stay and unskilled temporary migrants might be encouraged to leave.   
A fourth feature of temporary migration, which is our primary interest in this paper, is 
that temporary migrants may on average work more hours than permanent migrants.  Part of the 
reason for this higher anticipated number of hours is because they may invest less in becoming 
assimilated to the local labor market.  This assimilation has been studied by Chiswick (1972) who 
found that for the US wage rates of migrants and natives converged with time due to early   7 
investment in human capital specific to the destination labor market.  Most studies have followed 
Chiswick in looking at earnings.  For Germany, the results are mixed depending upon the design 
of the study. For example, Dustmann (1993) found a large and persistent earnings gap while 
Schmidt (1997) finds little initial gap upon accounting for education differences.
4
 
    Temporary 
migrants, being less interested in assimilation and more interested in accumulating assets and 
transferring these assets to the home country, may supply more labor.  This implication has 
received little attention in the literature.  An exception is Dustmann and Schmidt (2001) who 
consider the labor supply of immigrant women.  They find that these women, while receiving 
lower wage rates than native women, are more likely to have a full-time job.  We would expect a 
similar result in comparing temporary with permanent migrants.  We will now consider a model 
of temporary migration to explore this implication for all immigrants.   
Model of Temporary Migration 
That temporary migrants supply more hours than their permanent counterparts can be 
explained using a household production model as developed by Becker (1965).  In this model the 
household does not receive direct utility from consuming goods.  Instead, the household receives 
utility from consuming commodities.  These commodities are produced using time and goods 
purchased on the market.  The household receives utility from consuming these household 
produced commodities.   The implicit prices of these commodities are derived from the 
household production functions.  These prices will differ with the human capital of the 
household, other features of the background of household members and, of particular concern 
here, the location of the household.   
                                                 
4 See Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz (2005) for a review of the literature on Germany.     8 
Household production models have been formally extended to migration decisions by 
Shields and Shields (1993) and Shields (1995).  In these models, the household technology 
differs by location.  These differences are reflected in the implicit prices of commodities 
consumed.  For example, assume the household maximizes the utility of consuming commodities 
at the two different locations.  In other words a migrant maximizes 
(1)  U = U(ZD,ZO)   
Subject to  
(2)  I = A + wDTD + wOTO = πDZD + πOZO, 
where the subscripts D and O represent the destination and the origin, Zi represents commodities 
consumed; πi represents the shadow price of an aggregate commodity, wi the wage rate and Ti the 
amount of time that is spent at each location, where i = O, D.  O is the original country of the 
migrant and D is the destination country to which the migrant has moved, in this case Germany.  
The person or family is assumed to have already migrated.  Hence, all variables refer to future 
values.  In this case, a permanent migrant is at a corner solution where ZO and TO are both zero.     
The household technology for producing these commodities depends on the location of 
the household, its human capital, where this human capital was developed and the strength of its 
ties to that location.  Since the initial human capital of migrants was developed while they were 
residing in the source country, the human capital is partly specific to the source.  Therefore, the 
implicit price of commodities would be expected to be lower at the source, particularly for recent 
migrants than at the destination.  Consequently, we would expect that the shadow price at the 
destination exceeds the shadow price at the source.  In other words, that 
(3)  πD > πO.     9 
Furthermore, family ties to the source would be expected to further widen this difference in 
shadow prices because contacts with these family members may be an important commodity 
which the household consumes.  Temporary migrants can take advantage of this difference in 
shadow prices.  The optimal strategy might well be to temporarily migrate in order to generate 
savings that can then be transferred to the source when the migrant returns, where the cost of 
commodities is much lower than at the destination.  Consumption would be suppressed at the 
destination because of its higher costs coupled with the desire to transfer this consumption to the 
source for future consumption at lower prices.  A permanent move would imply higher costs of 
consumption for a much longer period of time and, even though it may imply higher wage rates, 
it could be sub-optimal.   
If the motivation for a move is for higher wages, instead of for political or lifestyle 
reasons, the wage rate at the destination will exceed the wage rate ar the origin, wD > wO.  
Permanent migration will be preferred to remaining at the source country if real income, 
evaluated in terms of shadow prices, is higher at the destination.  In other words if  
(4)  wD/πD > wO/πO.   
Higher wage rates at the destination would have to be large enough to cover higher living costs 
plus the costs of a move in order for a family to migrate.  However, even if inequality (4) holds, 
the family may still prefer temporary to permanent migration.  The difference in shadow prices, 
equation (3), provides an incentive for temporary migration.  A migrant family can earn income 
at the destination, where income is higher, save and transfer the foregone consumption to the 
origin where consumption costs are lower.   
  To illustrate the investment nature of temporary migration, consider two time periods.  
The first period begins at the time the household made the migration decision.  This decision   10 
involves whether to remain at the origin, to temporarily migrate or to permanently migrate.  
Consumption in each period is denoted as 
1 z  and 
2 z in periods 1 and 2.  The temporary migrant 
consumes 
1
D z  and 
2
O z  in each period.  The permanent migrant consumes 
1
D z  and 
2
D z  in each 
period.   
  This framework can be used to characterize the expected lifetime consumption of the 
household at the time of the migration decision.  There are three possible choices.  They are not 
to migrate, to temporarily migrate and to migrate permanently.  In making this decision, the 
family will need to evaluate differences in the shadow prices of commodities with differences in 
full income.  On the simplifying assumption that shadow prices and full income are the same in 
each period, the choices will amount to selecting different paths of lifetime consumption.  
Lifetime consumption for household that do not migrate is 
(5) 
12
OO zz + , where 
 
21 / [( / ) ] (1 ) O OO OO O zI I z r ππ = + −+  .   
Lifetime consumption for households that permanently migrate is 
(6) 
12
DD zz + , where 
 
21 / [( / ) ] (1 ) D DD D D D z II I z r π = + −+  .   
Finally, lifetime consumption for household that temporarily migrate is 
(7) 
12
DO zz + , where 
 
21 / [( / ) ] (1 ) O OO DD D zI I z r ππ = + −+  .   
Note that the bracketed terms in (5), (6) and (7) represents savings from the first period used to 
augment consumption in the second period.     11 
Since interest rates and exchange rates will influence the rate of return on savings, they 
will also influence the temporary versus permanent migration decision.  It should be emphasized, 
however, that exchange rates will not be able to generate parity in the costs of commodity 
consumption.  This is because commodities are non-tradable.  They are produced, by the 
household, from inputs of time and goods.  Even if all goods are tradable, time is not.  Hence, 
exchange rates can not equalize the shadow prices of commodities in the two markets, origin and 
destination.  This is a key difference in emphasis between the household production approach and 
standard approaches in terms of the costs of buying goods.  Exchange rate shocks, however, will 
still influence household decisions.  While using a conventional model, Yang (2008) tests the 
investment nature of the savings of temporary migration.    Yang (2008) argues that exchange 
rate shocks are a source of transitory income for families with a temporary migrant outside the 
source country.  A deterioration in the value of a source country’s currency with  respect to the 
currency in the destination will increase the value of savings at the destination that can be 
remitted back to the family in the source.  Yang found that this windfall had a positive and 
significant effect on investment, in physical and human capital, at the source but had no 
significant impact on consumption at the source.  This result would also hold for a household 
production approach because there would be a windfall due to the lower cost of purchasing goods 
when the migrant returns to the origin.   
Migrants have choices regarding the types of investment they wish to make upon arriving 
at their destination.  They can invest in human capital specific to the destination.  This will 
increase their rate of assimilation thereby increasing the wage rate they will earn.  Permanent 
migrants are more likely to make this sort of investment.  They could alternatively accept a lower 
wage rate and invest in financial assets that can be transferred if they return to their home   12 
country.  Temporary migrants are more likely to make this sort of investment.  They would 
suppress the consumption of commodities in the destination and work more hours in order to 
transfer money for later consumption at the origin.  The first type of investment is more attractive 
to those intending to migrate permanently and the second is more attractive to temporary 
migrants.  Consequently, temporary migrants would be expected to, on average, work more hours 
than permanent migrants.  It is this proposition that we will test in the next section.   
 
Empirical Model and Data 
The German Socioeconomic Panel is the main source of data for this study.  It is a household-
based study that annually surveys a representative sample of the German population since 1984.   
The study includes many socio-economic and demographic variables including variables that can 
be used to identify the attachment immigrants have to the German labor market.  Respondents are 
asked about their intentions to remain in Germany.  Up to and including 1995, respondents were 
asked if they “planned to return to their native country.”  After 1995 respondents were asked if 
they “wish to remain in Germany permanently.”  A dummy variable, permanent?, was created 
(permanent? = 0 for those with a desire to either leave Germany or to return to their native 
country depending upon the phrasing of the question).     
The hours worked by migrants in a month will be estimated as a function of the following 
variables:Permanent?  (defined above), female? (the gender of the person equals 1 if female and 
0 otherwise), age, age
2, school (years of education), and years since migration.  Permanent?, as 
discussed previously is expected to be negatively related to hours worked because temporary 
migrants will spend less time investing in human capital specific to the German labor market.  
Age and age
2 are related to human capital.  Workers initially are expected to work more hours as   13 
they become more experienced, accumulate more relevant human capital and become more 
attractive to employers.  Eventually, however, their mental and physical skills may diminish and 
they either become less able to work or more likely to retire.  Consequently, we might expect age 
to have a positive impact on hours worked and age
2 to have a negative impact.  The sign of 
Married? would be negative if marriage results in at least one spouse having less attachment to 
the labor market.  School, years of schooling, also represents human capital.  Since education is 
thought to be general human capital
5
Since the data set is a panel, we know the year the questions were asked.  We also know 
the state within Germany in which the person lived in that year.  The region and year are both 
expected to influence hours worked.  Furthermore, they are both expected to influence the 
number of permanent versus temporary migrants.  Temporary migrants may be recruited to work 
in areas and in years when workers are in short supply and leave when they are no longer in high 
demand.  Consequently, the proportion of migrants who are temporary may be higher in years 
and states with a prosperous economy.  Consequently, fixed and random time and state effects 
need to be considered to correct for possible biases.   
, it enhances the migrant’s ability to adapt to changing 
economic conditions and to more easily maintain steady employment.  Hence, school is expected 
to have a positive impact on hours worked.  Finally, the length of time the migrant has been in 
Germany, ysm, is expected to be related to human capital specific to Germany and, hence, 
positively related to hours worked.   
  Another possible source of bias comes from the likelihood that permanent? is 
endogenous.  The plans and attitudes of migrants toward remaining in Germany will in part 
depend upon their success in the German labor force.  Those workers who experience difficulty 
in finding stable employment and thus work fewer hours than they wish may, as a result, become 
                                                 
5 See T, W, Schultz (1975).   14 
less attached to Germany.  Consequently, the endogeneity of permanent? could imply that those 
migrants who indicate that they are temporary work fewer hours. Recall, however, that we 
expected temporary migrants to supply more labor.  Consequently, the endogeneity bias in a 
model with hours worked on the left hand side and permanent? on the right hand side would be 
in the positive direction.  Since we believe the structural direction is negative, we would expect 
reduced form estimates to be biased toward the null hypothesis or even lead to an incorrect sign.  
Hence, our main model will attempt to solve the endogeneity problem by introducing an 
instrumental variable.   
  The instrument we have chosen is whether the household reports family networks in 
another country.  Relatives abroad? is a candidate to be an instrument because it is exogenous to 
the labor market in Germany.  The dummy variable, Relatives abroad?, reporting the existence of 
these networks is expected to be negatively related to the attachment an immigrant feels towards 
Germany.  It picks up the existence of relatives living abroad other than mother or father, (ex-
spouse, children, siblings or grand parents) with whom the respondent has close contacts.
6
  For the analysis we consider foreign born males (1,542 individuals with 13,477 
observations) and females (1,024 individuals with 7,275 observations) with at least 10 and at 
 Those 
immigrants, for which Relatives abroad? = 1, are expected to be less attached to Germany for 
numerous reasons.  First, the existence of such a network might indicate an emotional attachment 
to another country.  Second, regardless the strength of this emotional attachment, the existence of 
such a network provides information about another labor market and perhaps a greater 
opportunity of a successful move to that market. Note that for these arguments to hold it is not 
necessary that these relatives live in the country of immigrant's origin. 
                                                 
6 This information was collected in 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006. The values for the missing years are imputed 
backward.   15 
most 350 hours worked per month, 1.5 to 300 EUR hourly wage,  and 16-60 and 16-55 years of 
age for males and females, respectively. We prudently omit individuals who are very recent 
arrivals with less than one year since migration, as these might include a large share of temporary 
seasonal workers and posted professionals. We also disregard individuals with missing 
information for the considered variables.  
Table 0 summarizes the key variables. We consider permanent migrants, those that do not 
want to stay permanently, and those that would like to return within next three years. We observe 
that hours worked decrease with tenure whereas the wage rate increases with tenure.
7
 
 These raw 
results are in line with the theoretical model developed above.  Looking at Table 0, we see that 
migrants in Germany work an average of about 160 hours per month.  The average hours worked 
per week is then approximately 36.7.  There is considerable variation in hours worked with a 
monthly standard deviation that is close to 50 hours per month.    If we assume a normal 
distribution, look at the histograms shown in Figure 1for a visual assessment of whether the 
distribution is normal, the probability that someone works at least 26.5 hours per month more 
than the average is 0.3.  Similarly, the probability that someone works at least 26.5 hours per 
month less that the average is 0.3.  Let us now look at the results of the empirical strategy to see 
whether they are robust with respect to the various confounding factors. 
The Results 
 
  The results of the various regressions are shown in Tables 1 through 5.  Results for some 
explanatory variables are not reported.  These results include dummy variables for 16 (of 17) 
                                                 
7 Permanent3 is 1 for anyone who plans to stay in Germany more than 3 years, 0 otherwise.   16 
German states and dummy variables for each parity (the number of children).  Results for state 
dummies are not reported because they are not of primary interest in this study.  The parity 
results are not reported because they are typically insignificant.  
8
Table 1 shows results for both males and females.  In addition to the explanatory variables 
discussed above, a dummy variable indicating gender is introduced.  This variable is Female?, 
which  would be negatively related to migration if migrants follow a typical pattern where 
women are less attached to the labor market than men.  Four different types of estimates are 
shown.  The first column is a fixed individual effect model of monthly hours worked by German 
immigrants.  All the variables have the expected sign.  It should be noted, however, that while 
permanent? is negative, it is insignificant.  This possibility was anticipated since endogeneity 
bias was expected to be positive while the anticipated structural effect was expected to be 
negative.  The results for random individual effects shown in column two are close to the fixed 
effects results.   
 
  The two stages of the instrumental variable model are shown in the next two columns.  
The first stage results are shown in column three.  Relatives abroad? has a strong negative impact 
on the worker’s attachment to Germany.   Using relatives abroad? as an instrument results in a 
significant and negative impact of permanent? on hours worked.  Furthermore the size of the 
estimated coefficient is substantial.  It indicates that workers with strong ties to the German 
market on average work 68 fewer hours per month than their temporary migrants.  On a weekly 
basis, the results indicate that temporary migrants ceteris paribus work about 15 more hours than 
permanent migrants.   
  Tables 2 and 3 show estimates for males.  There is, of course, no gender dummy variable.  
Another difference is that the hourly wage rate is included in some models.  Since there may be 
                                                 
8 We will gladly provide the complete results upon request.     17 
another endogeneity problem in introducing the hourly wage rate, results are shown both without 
(A) and with (B) this variable in Table 2 and again in Table 4.  Whether or not the hourly wage 
rate is included in the model does not appear to have influenced the results for other variables.  
Table 2 shows a comparison of OLS results with a fixed effect model.  In both models, 
permanent?, while negative, is insignificant.  The only differences between the models worth 
noting are that married, while significant in the OLS model, was insignificant in the fixed effect 
model, and years since migration were dropped from the fixed effect model.   
  Instrumental variable results for males are shown in Table 3.  Estimates using both two 
stage least squares and generalized two stage least squares (i.e. with individual fixed effects) are 
reported.   There is little difference in the results for either procedure.  In addition, in the second 
stage permanent? Becomes significant and of a magnitude similar to what was found in Table 1.  
Temporary migrant males would seem to work from 59 hours to 77 hours more per month than 
their permanent migrant counterparts.
910
  Tables 4 and 5 show estimates for females.  The primary difference for females is that 
there is no support for the hypothesis that temporary female migrants work more hours than 
permanent female migrants.
   
11
 
  Another difference is in Table 5.  There is a substantial difference 
between the results of two stage least squares and generalized two stage least squares suggesting 
that caution should be exercised in interpreting the results for females.  
Conclusions 
                                                 
9 The mean and standard deviation of monthlhrs are 174.1 and 41.1 for males and  135.2 and 54.0 for females. See 
the histogram in Figure 1. 
10 We estimated the IV model for immigrant males with various years sinc emigration. It turns out that the result that 
permanent migrants supply les hours holds for immigrants with less years since migration, for those with many (e.g. 
>15) years since migration the standard errors increase way beyond significance. 
11 This result differs from Dustman (2000), who found that women who are temporary migrants worked more hours 
than men.     18 
Upon correcting for endogeneity, bias temporary migrants are found to work more hours 
than permanent workers.   This result supports a household production model of migration where 
migrants may be temporary by choice and not because of legal restrictions or even a bad 
experience in the labor market.  Workers may be temporary because of strong ties to the source 
country that is manifested in lower costs of household production for the commodities they wish 
to consume.  The results provide a dramatic example of the need to account for possible 
endogeneity bias in studies involving intentions, in this case the intent to remain in Germany.  
They also suggest that recruiting migrants who will become assimilated easily is not necessarily 
welfare improving.  Migrants who intend to only partially assimilate may be more motivated to 
succeed and to work hard. Indeed, compared to permanent immigrants, temporary immigrants 
have stronger attachment to the labor market, but downskilling and brain waste are of concern. If 
initial perceptions differ from actual realizations (want to stay but leave; want to return but stay), 
suboptimal investment in country specific human capital can occur. Therefore, immigration and 
integration policies targeting temporary and permanent immigrants need to account for the 
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Table 0:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Permanent Migrants     
Variable  mean  Standard deviation 
Age  38.44  10.46 
% female  0.36  0.48 
Hourly wage  12.16  8.67 
Monthly hours  159.68  50.51 
 
Temporary Migrants 
   
Age  38.96  10.58 
% female  0.35  0.47 
Hourly wage  12.04  8.72 
Monthly hours  161.68  48.47 
 
 
Table 1:  Hours worked by German immigrants 


















































































. . . . .  . . . . .  -0.457 
(-8.23)** 
. . . . . 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
**Significant at 1% level.     22 
 






















Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
**Significant at 1% level.   
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74.009  57.794  4.624  -34.684 
Hourly wage 
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Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
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Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
**Significant at 1% level.   
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97.288  89.352  144.764  157.130 
Hourly wage 
 
. . . . .  -0.787 
(-10.04)** 
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Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
**Significant at 1% level.  
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Figure 1: Histograms 
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